Land & Water Law Review
Volume 8

Issue 2

Article 6

1973

Environmental Law - State and Federal Environmental Impact
Statements - What Type of Activity Constitutes a Project or Major
Action - Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono
County
Thomas E. Root

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Root, Thomas E. (1973) "Environmental Law - State and Federal Environmental Impact Statements - What
Type of Activity Constitutes a Project or Major Action - Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of
Mono County," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , pp. 565 - 581.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Root: Environmental Law - State and Federal Environmental Impact Statem

CASE NOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-State and Federal Environmental Impact StatementsWhat Type of Activity Constitutes a Project or Major Action. Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 1, 500 P.2d
1360, 124 Cal. Rptr. 16, as modified, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104
Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).

Action was brought on petition of administrative mandamus, attacking the grant of a use permit by Mono County
Board of Supervisors to International Recreation, Ltd. for
proposed construction of condominiums, shops, and a restaurant. The Cailfornia Supreme Court stated that the California Environmental Quality Act of 19701 required an environmental impact report of all state agencies on all proposed
state projects they intend to carry out which may have a significant effect upon the environment. The court held that
the language "any project they intend to carry out" includes
private activity for which a permit or other similar entitlement is required.2
This case is significant because it construes language
similar to that found in acts in force in Montana,3 New Mexico,4 North Carolina,' Washington,' Wisconsin,' and the National Environmental Policy Act,8 and is the first high court
ruling on such language. The purpose of this note is to examine
legislation, cases, and guidelines to determine what is meant
by the words "project", "major action", and other similar
language. This note is divided into several parts: part I will
examine the principal case, the subsequent legislation it
prompted, and the guidelines issued pursuant to that later
legislation; part II will examine NEPA, cases construing the
language "major federal action" found in NEPA, and the
guidelines issued pursuant to NEPA; part III will look at
1. CAL. PUB.
referred to
2. 8 Cal. 3d 1,
S. MONT. REV.

RES. CODE §§ 21000-21107 (West Supp. 1972).
as EQA].
500 P.2d 1360, 1366, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972).
CODES ANN. §§ 69-6501 to -6517 (Supp. 1971).

4. N.M.

ANN.

5.
6.
7.
8.

STAT.

[Hereinafter

§§ 12-20-1 to -7 (Supp. 1971).

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -20 (Cur. Supp. 1971).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010 to -.060 (Supp. 1971).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (found in Wis. Legislative Service printed in 1972).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) [Hereinafter referred to as NEPA].
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the various state acts in light of the similarities and differences in language between them and the California Act and
NEPA. It will also draw conclusions as to the possible influence of California and federal law upon these state acts.
I.

Friends of Malmrnoth AND ITS

ATTENDANT LEGISLATION

AND GTuIDELINES

The specific section of EQA construed by the court was
Section 21151. It states:
The legislative bodies of all cities and counties which
have an officially adopted conservation element of

a general plan shall make a finding that any project
they intend to carry out, which may have a significant effect on the environment, is in accord with the
conservation element of the general plan. All other
local governmental agencies shall make an environmental impact report on any project they intend to
carry out which may have a significant effect on the
environment and shall submit it to the appropriate
local planning agency as part of the report required
by Section 65402 of the Government Code.9
The court stated that Mono County did not have a conservation element of a general plan; hence the first sentence of the
section was not applicable. An impact report would be required
only if the activity was a "project" within the meaning of
the second sentence.
The court said nowhere in the act was the word "project"
defined, but their task was "aided somewhat" by the inclusion in the Act of Legislative Intent"0 and Additional Legislative Intent" sections. The reading of these sections along
with the one under consideration led the court to conclude,
"[T]he Legislature intended to include within the panoply
9.

CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21151 (West Supp. 1972). An identical section is
not found in any of the other state acts cited. However, the language construed by the court also occurs in Section 21100 of EQA, a section similar
to those found in the other state acts. Presumably the construction given by
the court would be uniform and hence the discrepancy is not significant
except in a narrowly technical sense.
10. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000 (West Supp. 1972).
11. Id. § 21001. These statements are general in language and for the most
part indicate a legislative concern with the deterioration of the California
environment. Typical is subsection (a) which states that the legislature
declares it is the policy of the state to "develop and maintain a high-quality
environment now and in the future, and take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state."
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of the act's provisions private activities for which a permit,
lease or other entitlement is necessary.' 1
The court laid particular emphasis upon Section 21000
(g) 3 concluding that the word "regulates" as therein used
was evidence that the legislature contemplated inclusion of
governmental, as well as propretary, functions within the
scope of the Act.
The court then considered the defendant's contention
that the word "project" ought to be read together with the
words "they intend to carry out". This reading, the defendant's claimed, must lead to the conclusion that the scope of
the Act was limited to public works. The court noted the lack
of definition of terms in the Act itself, the Legislative Intent,
and the inconclusive nature of the dictionary definition of
those terms. For guidance the court turned to the National
Environmental Policy Act. The court pointed out the similarity in languge of the two acts and the timing of their passage, concluding, "[M]uch of the phraseology of the EQA is
either adopted verbatim from or is clearly patterned upon
the federal act."' 4 This made NEPA and its guidelines
significant.
Having found that NEPA uses the word "actions"
whereas EQA uses the word "projects" the court turned to
the federal guidelines. 5 In them, "projects" are listed as
subsets of "actions". Nevertheless, "projects" includes
leases, permits, certificates, or other entitlements for use. The
court then concluded, given legislative knowledge of federal
guidelines, that the legislature must have intended that the
word be so used. The court held that "projects" included the
issuance of leases, permits, or other entitlements for use.
12. 104 Ca. Rptr. 16, 500 P.2d 1360, 1366, modified, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d
1049 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
13. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West Supp. 1972):
The Legislature finds and declares as follows:
(g) it is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the
state government which regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are found to
affect the quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing
environmental damage.
14. Friends of Mammoth, supra note 12, at 1369.
15. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390, ouperceded by, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
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Having broadly interpreted "projects", the court said
that the granting or denying of a permit is an act which the
government can carry out, thus disposing of the public
works argument.
JTustice Sullivan dissented on the grounds that the language of the statute was plain, that the court was to follow
this plain meaning, and the language "projects they intend to
carry out" clearly referred to only public works.
It should be noted that nowhere in the original opinion
were the words "which may have a significant affect on the
environment" construed. In its later modified opinion" the
court called attention to this fact, stating that it had not dealt
with that language because it had not been shown whether or
not the proposed activity would have such an affect. The court
left determination of that issue to future proceedings, legislation, or administrative action. Also in that modified opinion, issued November 6, 1972, the court refused to make its
holding prospective only, thus bringing within the sweep of
the original decision those private projects commenced after
November 23, 1970 (the effective date of EQA), but before
September 21, 1972 (the date of the original Friendsof Mammoth decision).
Not unexpectedly, Friendsof Mammoth caused an uproar
in California. It attracted the attention of the national press
which highlighted the effect of the decision on builders,
bankers, and unions, among others." '
At this point, the California Legislature took action. On
December 5, 1972, the amended EQA became law. 8 Far more
comprehensive than the original act, only those sections which
concern the meaning of the phrase "projects they intend to
carry out which may have a significant affect upon the environment"'" need concern us here. In this regard, the new
EQA codifies Friends of Mammoth in part, overrides it in
part, and goes far beyond it in great measure.
16. 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
17. The Wallstreet Journal, Oct. 9, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
18. CAL. PuB. RES.CODE §§ 21000-21174 (7 West's Cal. Legis. Serv. 2638, 1972).
19. Id. §§ 21151, 21065, 21169, 21170, 21080(b), 21172, 21083, 21084, 21085.
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Legislative approval of Friends of Mammoth can be seen
in two sections. Section 21151,20 the section originally considered by the court, was amended. That section's coverage
was extended from the original to include all government
agencies, and not simply those cities and counties having a
general conservation plan. Significant to this discusssion is the
language found in that section "or approve". This language
would seem to indicate that the regulatory function of
state agencies is also included, a position consistent with the
holding in Friends of Mammoth.
The second, and most important section approving
Friendsof Mammoth defines "project". It states:
"Project" means the following:
(a) Activities directly undertaken by any public
agency.
(b) Activities undertaken by a person which are supported in whole or in part through contracts,
grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public agencies.
(c) Activities involving the issuance to a person of a
lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.21
Subsection (c) expressly adopts the holding of Friends
of Mammoth. Taken together with the words "or approve"
in amended Section 21151, it is clear the Legislature approved
the holding in the principal case insofar as it related to the
definition of "project".
But having rendered a pound of flesh, the legislature
ordained that not a jot of blood be spilt.
First, the legislature ratified those projects commenced
after the effective date of the original EQA which had not
been litigated.22 As to those which were in the courts, those
which had been commenced in good faith reliance and had
been already accompanied by substantial construction were
also ratified. Those projects which had been litigated and
20. Id. § 21151.
21. Id. § 21065.
22. Id. §§ 21169, 21170.
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had been reduced to final judgment were not ratified. The
legislature made all other sections of the act effective as of
April 5, 1973.
Second, the legislature exempted ministerial activities,2 8
emergency projects," and emergency repairs to public service
facilities necessary to maintain service.2 5
Third, the legislature empowered the Resources Agency
to draw up guidelines, to include projects, arranged by class,
which would be exempt on the grounds that they had been
found not to have a significant effect upon the environment.2
The net effort of this new legislative scheme is to shift
emphasis away from the word "project". The issue of whether or not an impact report is required depends upon the
answers to several narrower questions. They are:
1. Is the proposed activity a legislatively exempt
one 7
2. If not, is the proposed activity a "project"
within the meaning of the Act ?
3. If the proposed activity is a "project", is
that activity administratively exempt by determination of the Resources Agency ?
4. If the proposed activity is a "project", and
not exempt, will it have a significant affect
upon the environment ?
The guidelines aid in answering these questions.2 7 They
were issued on February 3, 1973 and are comprehensive. They
reinforce the legislative scheme in that they too emphasize
factors other than whether or not an activity is a "project".
Rather, they emphasize significant affect upon the environment.
This approach can be seen in those sections which deal
with the administrative exemptions determined by the Re23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. § 21080(b).

27.

CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 15000-15116 (1973). A copy of these guidelines can
be had by sending $1 plus tax to Department of General Services, State of
California, Documents Section, P.O. Box 20191, Sacramento, California
95820.

-Id. § 21172.
Id. § 21085.
Id. §§ 21083, 21084.
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sources Agency. 8 A reading of the classes exempted indicates that the Resources Agency had in mind those projects
which were trivial and routine.
Similarly, those sections which deal with significant affect upon the environment leave out those projects which
might ordinarily be expected to have such an effect, but due
to circumstances, will not. 9 In those cases in which conditions are found that will have a significant effect upon the
environment, a mandatory finding of significant effect is required and an impact report must follow. 0
Thus, the new EQA begins to look strangely like NEPA.
That is, the thrust of EQA has been molded by the legislature
These categorical exemptions are
divided into 12 classes. A brief sketch of each follows:
Class 1 refers to existing facilities. It consists of the operation, repair,
maintenance or minor alteration of existing public or private
structures facilities, mechanical equipment etc.
Class 2 refers to replacement or reconstruction. It consists of replacement
or reconstruction of existing structures and facilities where new
structures will be located on the same site as the structure replaced
and will have substantially the same purpose and capacity as the
structure replaced.
Class 3 refers to new construction of small structures. It consists of single,
new facilities or structures typified by single family dwellings,
motels, duplexes etc. of not more than 4 dwelling units, and stores,
offices, and restaurants designed for an occupancy load of 20
persons or less, as well as water main, sewage, electrical, gas and
other utility extensions.
Class 4 refers to minor alterations to land and consists of minor public or
private alterations in land, water, and/or vegetation. It is typified
by grading with a slope of less than 10%, new gradening or landscaping, and filling of previously excavated land.
Class 5 refers to alterations in land use limitations, exclusive of zoning,
and is limited to such alterations if minor.
Class 6 refers to information collection and consists of basic data collection,
research, experimental management and resource evaluation activities which do not result in a serious or major disturbance of an
environmental resource.
Class 7 refers to regulatory actions for protection of natural resources and
consists of actions taken by regulatory agencies to assure that
maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of a natural resource.
Class 8 refers to regulatory actions for the protection of the environment
and consists of actions taken by regulatory agencies to assure
maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of the environment.
Class 9 refers to inspections and consists of activities related to that
function.
Class 10 refers to loans and exempts those loans made by the Department
of Veterans affairs under the Veterans Farm and Home Purchase
Act of 1943.
Class 11 refers to accessory structures and consists of construction or
placement of minor structures accessory to existing commercial,
industrial, or institutional facilities. It is typified by on premise
signs and small parking lots.
Class 12 refers to surplus government property sales and consists of sales
of surplus government property except for parcels of land.
29. CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15083 (1973).
30. CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15082 (1973).

28.

CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 15100-15112 (1973).
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and the Resources Agency to emphasize effect upon the environment, limiting its coverage to only those projects which
are not routine and trivial in nature. NEPA languge apparently contemplates similar results when it states that an
environmental impact statement will be required only of those
"major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment." An analysis of this language is
the topic of part II.
II.

NEPA,

CASES, AND GUIDELINES

On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy
Act became law. The section of that Act with which we are
concerned is as follows:
[A] 11 agencies of the Federal Government shall(c) include in every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-'
Nowhere in the act are those words defined. Nor is the
legislative history 2 particularly helpful. The guidelines do
address themselves to the meaning of the word "actions" but
warn that those listed do not exhaust the possibilities.3
Neither the act nor the guidelines supply a test for determining what a "major federal action" is. For this one must turn
to the case law.
Case law is sparse. Some courts do not discuss the issue
at all, preferring to rest their decisions upon other grounds.3
31. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2) (C) (1970).
32. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H. R. REP. No. 91-378,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); CONF. REP. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)
CON(. REC. Vol. 115 (1969).
33. Supra note 15.
34. The following lists of cases are not intended to be exhaustive; they are
illustrative only. Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,
454 F.2d 613 (rd Cir. 1971) (NEPA not retroactive); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970) (NEPA not retroactive); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1970) (NEPA creates
no substantive right to raise jurisdiction challenging military defense
facility); Miltenberger v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 450 F.2d
971 (4th Cir. 1971) (NEPA not applicable to sale of property by private
corporation receiving federal aid); Concerned Citizens of Marlboro v. Volpe.
459 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir. 1972) (Federal involvement for purposes of NEPA
terminated with governmental approval and commitment of funds for
highway construction).
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Others assume the activity is such an action, but give no
basis for that assumption." Others were not faced with the
problem, since it was conceded by the parties that the activity
was a major federal action .
Fortunately, the issue has been aired by some courts.
From these decisions it is possible to extrapolate a working
definition of "major federal action".
The finest treatment of the problem occurs in Julis v.
City of Cedar Rapids. 7 In that case, the plaintiffs sought
preliminary injunctive and declaratory relief on grounds
that certain street construction in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, was in
violation of NEPA since the defendant had failed to prepare
an impact statement. The case is significant because the
court states the issues and analyzes them clearly. Not all
courts have followed this approach, and for this reason, the
opinion in Julis will be quoted at length:
The work . . . involves a total expenditure of

$651,515.55, $313,089.99 being the federal contribution. The construction area encompasses fourteen
blocks. The undertaking primarily eliminates a bottleneck by widening a portion of an existing major
traffic artery from two to four lanes and includes
traffic signal installations and a pedestrian overpass.
NEPA requires the filing of an environmental impact statement for "major Actions significantly affecting the quality of the humn environment." (Court's emphasis) Therefore the threshold
question for the court, involving a twofold determination, is whether the project is a "major federal
35. Daly v. Volpe, 326 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wash. 1971) (NEPA applicable to
construction of interstate highway); Izaak Walton League of America v.
Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971) (NEPA applicable to Atomic
Energy Commission issuance of an interim operating license); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NEPA applicable to A.E.C. procedural rules).
36. Fayettville Area Chamber of Commerce and Interstate 95 Committee v.
Volpe, 463 F.2d 402 (4th Cir. 1972) (interstate highway); Upper Pecos
Association v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971) (grant of funds by
economic development administration); Greene County Planning Board v.
Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972) (authorization
for construction of high voltage line) ; Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sale of oil and gas leases to
tracts of submerged lands off Louisiana coast).
37. 349 F. Supp. 88 (1972).
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action" and if "major", whether it significantly affects the quality of the human environment. Absent
either element, the act does not apply. (Emphasis
added).
[T]he inclusion of the term "major" raises
the obvious inference that not every federal action
was meant to be included. Congress evidently intended to exclude from consideration the myriad
minor activities with which the federal government
becomes involved.
• . . Webster's Third International Unabridged
Dictionary defines "major" as ". . . greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest: SUPERIOR
... greater in number, quantity, or extent: LARGER . . . notable or conspicuous in effect or scope:
CONSIDERABLE, PRINCIPAL . . ." (Court's
emphasis). It is the view of the court that by using
the term "major" Congress reasonably intended to
limit the Act to those federal actions of superior,
larger and considerable importance, involving substantial expenditure of money, time and resources."
The court then determined that the proposed construction
was not "major" and hence NEPA was not applicable. The
court rested its decision upon the fact that little land was to
be acquired, no parklands were being taken, no one was being
displaced from his home, and the Government expenditures
totalled only approximately $300,000.
The rationale of the court is important because it senses
the interrelationships of the words used by Congress. That is,
that there is a sequence of determinations to be made before
the impact statement requirement is triggered. If one were
to schematize these questions, the following arrangement is
suggested:
1. Is the proposed activity "major" as outlined
in Julis?
2. If "major", is the proposed activity "federal "?
38. Id. at 89.
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3. If "major" and "federal", is the proposed
activity an "action" as suggested in the CEQ
guidelines ?
4. If the proposed activity is a "major federal
action", will it have a significant effect upon
the environment?
Julis adequately answers the first question. Other
courts have made similar determinations, but on other
grounds. In Certain Named Members of the San Antonio
Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department,9 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had before it a case involving
highway construction. Total costs of the project were $18,
000,000, initial costs being $12,600,000. Because of these
figures, the court said that it had no difficulty in characterizing the project as "major federal action". The weakness
of the case lies in the fact that the amount of money expended
seems to go to the question of "major" and implicit is the
assumption that if the federal government is spending that
amount, it is "federal", but neither of these propositions is
made clear by the court.
The second question has also been analyzed by the courts.
In City of Boston v. Volpe," injunctive relief was requested
regarding the construction of a stretch of road by the Massachusetts Port Authority. The court said that the determination of when a project becomes federal is a factual one. The
application for federal funds, adoption of federal standards
and specifications in the hope of qualifying for federal assistance, or the tentative approval of a project by the federal
government does not make the activity federal. The court
seems to be saying that for a project to be "federal" there
must be actual federal participation in the project, not merely
anticipated participation.
In Ely v. Velde," action was brought to enjoin construction of a penal facility being constructed with assistance of
the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency pursuant to the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. When
39. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
41. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
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discussing the question of "major federal action", the court
said that, in view of the federal agency's overall involvement
in the promotion and planning of the facility, the activity
was a "major federal action".
Thus City of Boston and Ely stand for the proposition
that to make an activity "federal", there must be actual
federal participation and involvement.
Federal involvement can take many forms. In Davis v.
Morton,4 2 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that federal
approval of a lease of Indian lands constitutes "major federal
action". The court reasoned that federal liability might attach on Indian lands in the absence of agreement to the contrary, and hence the fact that the United States was a signatory to the contract made it more than a mere disinterested
party.
From the cases so far analyzed, this result seems hard
to justify. First, it is hard to see how federal approval of a
lease of Indian lands constitutes a "major" activity of the
federal government based on the rationale of the Julis case.
Second, it seems doubtful that the activity is even an "action"
since it is really the Indians who are granting the lease and
any "action" is between them and the developers who wished
to build on Indian land. From this standpoint, the federal
government is merely a bystander. Third, the court hinges
its activity on liability but such liability could be expressly
provided for. If this is so, does the express agreement not to
hold the government liable make it any less a "major federal
action"? The court is not clear.
Actually, what the court seems to mean is that anything
the Indians do, if it involves the federal government acting in
its position as trustee of the Indian lands, makes the Indian
action federal action. This seems to be the proposition for
which this case stands.
The third question-what is an action ?-is answered by
the CEQ guidelines"' and needs no analysis here.
42. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
43. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390, superceded by, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971):
Actione included. The following criteria will be employed by
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Having answered those three question, it seems proper to
posit a definition of "major federal action". It is suggested
that the following is a proper one:
A major federal action is an activity, illustrated by
the guidelines of the Council on Environmental
Quality, which is of considerable importance, characterized by federal participation, and involving
substantial expenditure of money, time, resources, or
planning expertise.
It is suggested that only if an activity satisfies this definition should the last question be asked: will that "major
federal action" have a significant affect upon the environment ?
However, some courts get confused. An example of this
can be seen in Scherr v. Volpe." In that case, the court held
that a highway construction project was a "major federal
action". This was obvious, the court said, because lanes and
interchanges would be added, access control would be altered,
and additional right of way would be acquired. What the
court impiles is that a major alteration of the landscape is a
"major federal action". But this rationale is misplaced
because alteration of the landscape goes to significant affect
on the environment and not whether alteration of the landscape in and of itself constitutes such an action.
agencies in deciding whether a proposed action requires the preparation of an environmental statement:
(a) "Actions" include but are not limited to:
(i) Recommendations or favorable reports relating
to legislation including that for appropriations. The requirement for following the section 102(2) (C) procedure
as elaborated in these guidelines applies to both (i) agency
recommendations on their own proposals for legislation
and (ii) agency reports on legislation initiated elsewhere.
(In the latter case only the agency which has primary responsibility for the subject matter involved will prepare an
environmental statement.) The Office of Management and
Budget will supplement these general guidelines with
specific instructions relating to the way in which the
section 102 (2) (C) procedure fits into its legislative clearance process;
(ii) Projects and continuing activities: directly undertaken by Federal Agencies; supported in whole or in
part through Federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans,
or other forms of funding assistance; involving a Federal
lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for
use;
(iii) Policy, regulations, and procedure-making.
44. 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
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A similar analysis is found in National Heliunm Corporation v. Morton." That case involved the cancellation of a
helium conservation contract by the Secretary of Interior.
The court said that it was undeniable that the Act compelled
Interior to comply with its provisions when action was being
taken having to do with a depletable resource. The court was
not clear if such action was "major" because of the work involved, or "federal" because of the federal interest in such
resources, or if it was an "action" covered by the guidelines.
The implication of the court's reasoning is that an impact
statement is required because such actions would have a significant affect on the environment. Again, this question is
misplaced until the prior determination of "major federal
action" is made.
But if one discounts these opinions, one is left with the
understanding that by approaching the problems in sequence,
Congress intended that only those activities which are major
and federal require an impact statement, and only if such
activities would have a significant affect on the environment.
The result then, is approximately the same under both
federal and California law. Both require a sequential
approach, with an impact statement or report being required
only if the sequence has been followed to its conclusion. The
laws differ in the method of working through this sequence,
the federal law being dependent upon proper judicial application of Congressional language, whereas the California law
depends primarily upon agency determinations pursuant to
an extensive set of guidelines.
With this in mind, attention will now turn to the state
acts.
III. THE STATE ACTS-CONCLUSIONS
A. The State Act Language
Montana, North Carolina, New Mexico, Washington, and
Wisconsin have acts similar to both EQA and NEPA." In
those sections relevant to this note, each requires an impact
45. 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).

46. See notes 1 thru 7 for citations to these acts.
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statement or report to be made by an agency when certain
of its activities significantly affects the environment. However, the language describing these activities differs from
act to act.4"
The language in NEPA, the Washington act, and the
New Mexico act are virtually identical. The Wisconsin act
differs from these insofar as it incorporates by reference
the CEQ guidelines. Montana's act adds the words "projects"
and "programs". The North Carolina act differs significantly from the other in that it restricts "actions" to those
involving expenditures of public moneys. The original California EQA differs from all of the above in that it used the
language "projects they intend to carry out" rather than

"'major actions".
B. Conclusions

From a technical standpoint, the Acts of Washington,
New Mexico, and Wisconsin are so close to the language of
NEPA as to make reasonable the conclusion that these states
ought to follow the federal lead in interpreting their acts.
This conclusion is predicated upon the assumption that the
legislature closely copied NEPA and would therefore favor
47. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C): "include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on--" [and] N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-20-6
(C): "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major state actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:"
[and] WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030(2) (C): "Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major actions
significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:", with Wis. STAT. § 1.11 (2) (c):
"Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement, substantially following the guidelines
issued by the United States Council on Environmental Quality . . .by the
responsible official on:" [and] MONT. Rnv. CODES ANN. § 69-6504(b) (3):
"include in every recommendation or report on proposals for projects, programs, legislation and other major actions of state government significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement on-"
[and] N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 113A-4 (2): "Any state agency shall include
in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and actions
involving expenditure of public moneys for projects and programs significantly affecting the quality of the environment of this State, a detailed
statement by the responsible official setting forth the following;" [and]
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100: "All state agencies, boards, and commissions
shall prepare or cause to be prepared by contract, and certify the completion
of an environmental impact report on any project they propose to carry
out or approve which may have a significant affect on the environment.
Such report shall include a detailed statement setting forth the following:"
(All emphasis added).
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a federally flavored interpretation as well. The same might
be said of Montana, assuming that the addition of the words
"projects and programs" is not a significant broadening of
the generic term "actions". Important here is the fact that
all of these state acts use the word "major" which is a limiting
adjective, a limitation not found in the California EQA when
Friends of Mammoth was decided.
Uniformity with federal law takes on added significance
in states such as Washington, New Mexico, and Montana
where federal land holdings are extensive.
North Carolina stands by itself. Its language is unlike
any of the others and the restrictions of "actions" to those
involving expenditures of public moneys points directly to
public works, a range more limited than either the California
or federal law.
Balancing the language argument, however, is the prestige of the California Supreme Court. As noted at the outset
of this note, no other state supreme court nor the United
States Supreme Court has yet ruled on such language. This
fact, added to the confusion in interpretation of NEPA in
the district and appellate courts in the federal system militates
in favor of the authority of Friends of Mammoth.
One additional technical factor to be taken into account
is the weight the court in Friends of Mammoth gave to the
legislative intent accompanying the EQA. This policy basis
would, of course, be lacking an any other state act since each
legislature makes its own policy statement. Thus, the cornerstone of Friends of Mammoth would possibly be lacking in
any other state.
But if one departs from the technical aspects of the
Friends of Mammoth decision and the state acts themselves,
other factors come into play.
Two factors are suggested as important. The first of
these is certainty in the law. In California, by virtue of the
later legislation and the extensive guidelines, the thrust and
policy of the law is clear. In addition, procedures to be followed to comply with the law are also readily ascertainable.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/6
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The federal law, on the other hand, is not clear as has been
pointed out previously. But to reach this desired end of
clarity, the step had to be taken by the California Supreme
Court which forced the California legislature to clarify its
meaning. The result was the present scheme. And this scheme
is the second factor.
As pointed out, supra, the federal law differs from the
California law in that it is judicially administered insofar
as determinations of "major actions" are concerned. California, however, is administered by agency. A court, in deciding the scope of the words "major actions" must take into
account the possible legislative result of a re-working of the
law. It is suggested that an administrative handling of the
problem, although threatening bureaucratic tie-ups, would
at least be uniform in application, a feature not present in
the federal administration of NEPA.
To summarize: The Friends of Mammoth decision is
persuasive in that it is the first high court decision rendered
on the coverage of environmental quality acts like those under
discussion. Its persuasive power is limited by two factors:
first, the language construed does not appear in any other
state act nor NEPA; and second, the court relied heavily
upon a declaration of legislative intent peculiar to California's Act.
The federal interpretation, on the other hand, enjoys the
status of being based upon the model for the state acts and
the interests of uniformity are strong. However, NEPA as it
has been interpreted suffers from confused approaches by
the courts. Because of this, the body of federal law makes a
difficult model to follow, even by those state supreme courts
which might be willing.
THOMAS E. ROOT
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